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1. Motivation
Since antiquity, philosophers have been challenged by the apparent
vagueness of everyday thought and experience. How, these philosophers have
wanted to know, are the things we say and think compatible with logical laws
such as Excluded Middle?1 A kindred attraction has been the question of how
truth presents itself — relatively and in degrees? in approximations? in
resemblances, or in bits and pieces? F.H. Bradley is a celebrated (or as the
case may be, excoriated) champion of the degrees view of truth.
There are, one may say, two main views of error, the absolute and
relative. According to the former view there are perfect truths, and on the
other side there are sheer errors... . This absolute view I reject... . All
truths and all errors in my view may be called relative and the difference
in the end between them is a matter of degree.2
The approximation view has been carefully examined in a number of recent
publications.3 The resemblance or truthlikeness position has also provoked a
sizable literature,4 and the partial truth position a lesser, but no less interesting
one.5
Vagueness (or what some commentators take to be vagueness) also
constitutes a problem (or part of a problem) for the evaluation of natural
language arguments. If we take the propositional calculus as our example,
logicians want to be able to say that a fragment of English when reconstructed
as an argument of the propositional calculus is valid if its reconstruction is. For
this to be true, reconstruction procedures must have the backwards reflection
property with respect to validity. A shorter way of saying this is that
reconstructions must be tight. And for that to be true, English on the hoof has to
be filtered in all sorts of ways before being accepted as inputs to our
reconstruction procedures. Filtered out will be such things as ambiguity,
tenses, higher-order quantification, adverbs and, presumably, vagueness.6
Vagueness also interests engineers. To get an utterly smooth ride on the new
bullet train anywhere in its range of 0 to 300 kilometers per hour, or to get a
completely still picture from a bouncing camcorder, or a fluffy, clean and dry
wash from an energy-efficient, speedy washing machine, it is necessary that
control systems be adept at manipulating vague instructions. Electrical
engineers have had good success in this regard by designing control systems
which model various structures of what has come to be called fuzzy set theory.
Fuzzy set theory was not invented by engineers. In 1951 Kaplan and Shott7
proposed to mark degrees of membership in empirical sets by the elements of
the unit interval, and to define in like manner the operations of intersection,

union, subset and complementation. Fourteen years later Lotfi Zadeh, an
electrical engineer at Berkeley, independently arrived at the same idea and
gave it a more elaborate mathematical articulation than the earlier authors.8 By
1975, Zadeh had hit upon the following thought. The structures that underlie the
engineering successes might be adapted in ways that allow us to claim various
philosophical successes, especially in the theory of human reasoning. In
particular, if we had a proper command of fuzziness, we should be able to give
principled, theoretical accounts of vagueness, degreed-truth, approximate
truth, truthlikeness, partial truth, and inexact reasoning (which is to say,
ordinary, everyday reasoning)9. Further, instead of having to construct filters to
bring natural language arguments up to a condition of input-worthiness for the
reconstruction rules of formal logic, we might be able to dispose with filtering
altogether by applying a fuzzy logic to natural languages directly.10
2. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy set theory is a model theoretic adaptation of the nondenumerably many
valued logic _À1 of _ukasiewicz, which is its base logic. We note that _À1
differs from the countably infinite many valued logic _À0, in which truth values
are the rational numbers in the unit interval [0-1], rather than its real numbers.
The set theory arises from the base logic by assigning fuzzy sets to atomic
predicates and defining a satisfaction relation on fuzzy sequences. Fuzzy logic,
in turn, is an extension of fuzzy set theory got by interpreting truth values as
fuzzy subsets of the set of values of the base logic, that is, fuzzy sets of the unit
interval. Because the fuzzy power set of the unit interval would encumber the
ensuing logic with fearsome complexity, fuzzy logicians restrict the theory to at
most countably many truth values. Zadeh calls these linguistic truth values,
which can be explained as follows. Truth (with a capital ‘T’) is a linguistic
variable, with values true, very true, not very true, etc. Lower case true is
primary, and the other values of True are defined in terms of true. Thus very
true = true2, not true = true _ , false p = true ¬p, and so on.
It may strike us that Zadeh is unaware of Lindenbaum’s proof of the
equivalence of _À0 and _À1, an equivalence which assures Zadeh’s base
logic of its desired countability and calls into question his imposition of
countability constraints on _À1. On the other hand, in quantificational
extensions of infinitely valued propositional logics, a well-defined model theory
requires for any set S of degrees of truth that S have a greatest lower bound
and a least upper bound. The requirement is met by the reals of the unit
interval, but not the rationals. So there is a good semantic reason for sticking
with _À1 as the base logic.
Here is an example of how fuzzy logic (FL) works. Object language predicates
determine fuzzy sets. Any member of the fuzzy set TALL is a member to some
or other degree. Say that Charlie is a member of TALL to degree 0.4. Then it
is true to a degree that Charlie is tall if Charlie is tall to degree 0.4. But keep in
mind that the metalinguistic "true" is also a vague predicate. Statements are

true or not only in degrees. Now since Charlie is only 0.4 degrees tall, that he is
tall in fact is not very true, where not being very true is being true to only a slight
degree, say 0.3.
Zadeh defines not very true in terms of true, and true, while "primitive", is not
indefinable. Indeed true is defined as

È(0.3/0.6,0.5/0.7,0.7/0.8,0.9/0.9,1/1)
that is, as the fuzzy set to which the degree of truth 0.6 belongs to true to
degree 0.3, degree of truth 0.7 has a 0.5 degree of membership, and so on.
It is not to our purpose to expose FL to detailed scrutiny. But it is well worth
noting11 that its truth values are not closed under propositional operations. Its
deduction rules are semantic rather than syntactic. Axiomatization issues are
"peripheral"12, and this makes otiose questions of consistency and
completeness. This is enough to persuade some people that FL is a logic in
name only.13 The harsher-minded of these critics incline to think of FL as the
"cocaine of science"14, or as "pornography".15 Notwithstanding their
provenance, these are silly remarks requiring nothing by way of serious reply.

More to the point, the reasoning routines of FL are very complex — expensive
things to work through in real time. Taking the measure of even simple
propositions such as "It is not very true that Charlie is tall" or, in one of Zadeh’s
own examples, "It is very true that Lisa is young", requires the computation of
what Zadeh calls compatability functions, themselves compositional functions.
The function is graphed in Figure 3 of "Fuzzy Logic and Approximate
Reasoning" (page 425); and is reproduced on this page. Of course, there is
complexity and complexity. Some critics have charged the fuzzy rules with
combinatorial explosiveness. In fact, increases in complexity are not
exponential, as Combs has shown.16 But still there is a lot of complexity in
fuzzy models, enough certainly to make them suspect from the point of view of
psychological reality.

Fuzzy logic, says Zadeh, "may be viewed as an attempt at accommodation
with the pervasive reality of fuzziness and vagueness in human cognition. In
this sense, fuzzy logic represents a retreat from what may well be an
unrealizable objective, namely, the construction of a rigorous mathematical
foundation for human reasoning and rational behaviour."17 If this is so, fuzzy
logic lays some claim as the logic or a basic part of the logic of actual human
thinking. And if this is so, the economic costs of real-time computation of
compatibility functions must somehow be offset. But how?
3. FL Reasoning
If it fulfills the promise of its inventor, FL can be said to model actual, everyday,
real-time human reasoning. Does it?
There is ample evidence that the world is fuzzy (and fractal, too). At molecular
levels, all is a cloud of witness, so to speak. It is also evident that although we
know how to conceptualize the world at such levels — after all, chemistry is a
mature science — this is not indeed how we experience the world or could
experience it. In these matters I find myself siding with Quine. Like Quine I
notice that the human subject
is accorded... certain patterns of irradiation in certain frequencies... and
in the fullness of time [he] delivers as output descriptions of the threedimensional external world and its history.18
The story of the journey from such "meager traces" to so "torrential [an] output"
is the story of how "from impacts on our sensory surfaces, we in our collective
and cumulative creativity down through the generations have projected our
systematic theory of the world."19 The "baffling tangle of relations between"20
temporarily ordered sets of exteroceptors on given occasions and our
command of the world of everyday experience, as well of those swampishly
below and galactically beyond, benefits from naturalistic scrutiny — the
combined insights of "neurology, psychology, psycholinguistics, genetics and
history".21
Perceptually and discursively we experience the world in a remarkably hardedged way. We may take it that our disposition to hard-edged, smooth-curved
representation derives in part from how we engage the world at what I am
loosely (fuzzily) calling molecular levels. For this to happen, information
processing mechanisms must engage the fuzzy. At this level, information is that
of which Shannon and Weaver’s theory gives a merely comparative
quantitative analysis, with an emphasis on how cardinal weighting weighs in.22
Processing information at this level, I assume to be a necessary condition on
noticing at what I'm going to call the macro-level that it is very true that Lisa is
young. Information processing at the molecular level is subconscious. Once
consciousness enters the picture, representation becomes a dominant factor,
and a linear one. But real-time linear treatments of highly complex phenomena
are inordinately inefficient. I infer from this that the real-time information

processes are offset by a correspondingly economical displacement of fuzzy
phenomena with hard-edged, smooth-curved representations. But again, how?
It may be that the high cost of computing Zadeh’s compositional functions is
made manageable by high speed calculations using a parallel distributed
processing architecture. It may be, that is to say, that something like FL
operations are at work down below. Certainly PDP programs execute rather
perkily when the embedded logic is fuzzy. If so, they are probably subcortical,
and certainly subconscious, prelinguistic and non-linear. I say that it "may be"
that information processing down below has something of the character of FL
reasoning. Something of that character, perhaps, but not much. To make of FL
a plausible candidate for subconscious engagement of the fuzziness down
below, realm, certain of its defining features must go, including (especially) all
those in virtue which FL is a model theory laid atop the output of a complex
context-free grammar. And some will think that, shorn of such structure, too
little remains to justify the name of FL.
At the macro-level, information graduates from Shannon and Weaver
quantities to something that flows in something like the manner of Dretske23 or
(better) Timothy Schroeder24. It is now that, the processing of which, takes
representation, linearity, and time. (At the graduating juncture, by the way, we
see the point of the distinction between relevance to and relevance for.25) The
offset, as I say, is the substantial simplification offered by a hard-edged,
smooth-curved world. At the molecular level we loose perspective, which is
one of the things offered by hard-edged and smooth-curved worlds. At this
level the inefficiencies of linear representation and information processing are
offset by the benefits of effective risk aversion that hard-edged, smooth-curved
worlds make possible. (For one thing, it is discernible in such worlds that the
tiger is approaching rather than departing.) This suggests an answer the
question of two paragraphs ago.
4. Classical Logic
Let us recur to the claim that fuzzy logic
may be viewed as an attempt to accommodation with the pervasive
reality of fuzziness and vagueness in human cognition. In this sense, fuzzy
logic represents a retreat from what my well be an unrealizable objective,
namely, the construction of a rigorous mathematical foundation for human
reckoning... .26
The passage suggests that Zadeh is one of very many people who think that
classical logic fails for natural languages. It would matter if this skepticism were
justified. If classical logic did fail for natural languages, there would be an
important vacancy in the theory of practical argument, and we could at least
consider fuzzy logic as a candidate for the job. All the more so if, as Zadeh
appears to believe, it is the "pervasive reality of fuzziness and vagueness" that
puts paid to classical theories. A negative answer to our question would also

matter. If the "pervasive unity of fuzziness and vagueness" didn’t topple
classical logic, then the following argument would seem to be all but
unstoppable.
1. The pervasive reality of fuzziness and vagueness leaves classical
logic in tact.
2. Therefore, classical logic is just as good as theory of human reasoning
with fuzzy vocabularies as it is a theory of reasoning in vocabularies that
are entirely precise.
It is easy to show that the fuzziness and vagueness of natural language cause
classical logic no embarrassment.
What would it be for QT, classical first order logic, to fail in English? It would fail
if there were valid forms in QT or logical truths of QT which fail for certain
interpretations of their atomic constituents. QT-formalization is such that
properties such as validity and logical truth have the backwards reflection
property. Let Σ be an English construction. If its logical form is valid in QT , it
too is valid. If its logical form in QT is a logical truth, it too is a logical truth.27
Our question, then, is whether any QT principle fails on a fuzzy interpretation of
its atomic constituents. In other words, do fuzzy instantiations cancel the
backwards reflection mechanism for validity and logical truth? The answer is
No. No logical law of QT is overturned by adding a vague predicate to its
classical language. Under such lexical supplementation, no logical particle
would be semantically altered, no new semantic categories would be added,
and no new kinds of grammatical structure. The logic of the resulting language
would be unchanged. It would still be a classical logic. It would still be a logic
that honoured the principle that a logical truth is a sentence whose truth value
owes nothing to meaning, save the meaning of its logical particles.
Against this it could be insisted that Bivalence fails in such a language, and
since Bivalence is a classical law, classical logic fails. It does not. Bivalence is
proclaimed for the formal language of QT, a language whose atoms are
uninterpreted. A QT formalization of a language containing vague, predicates
does not have the backwards reflection property with regard to bivalence, but
this no more disturbs classical logic than does the non-backwards reflection of
invalidity. We can admit that "The present king of France is bald" is (twiceover) non-bivalent. This means in particular that negation does not in fact turn a
designated truth value into an anti-designated truth value. Even so, the
following argument is valid.
1. The present kind of France is bald or the Banach-Tarski
theorem is defective.
1. ¬(The present king of France is bald).
2. Therefore, the Banach-Tarski theorem is defective.

For what does a judgement of validity come to? It judges that if the premisses
are true, so too, necessarily, in the conclusion. And this is true.
We are a long way from saying that no case can be made for fuzzy logic,
anymore than we would say that no case can be made for supervaluational
logic28 or free logic. Even if we suppose wholly satisfactory motivations for
such logics, it cannot be that they make any case for the collapse of classical
logic. Of course, there are nonclassical logics which exhibit the logical forms of
English constructions and which QT cannot capture. This makes it true to say
that QT is not the logic of English. This is so, but before we make too much of
it, we should remark that the same is true of the propositional calculus PC in
relation to QT itself. QT isn’t the logic of English, but it comes closer to being
so than PC. It is one thing for a logic not to be the logic of English. It is another
thing entirely whether not being the logic of English is being a logic that English
falsifies. QT is not the logic of English; and English abounds in vague
predicates. But vague predicates do nothing to invalidate QT’s valid argument
forms or the logical forms of its logical truths. So I say again that classical logic
is as good a theory of natural language arguments in which vague predicates
are deployed as it is a theory of such arguments in which no vague predicates
are deployed.
5. A Heideggerian Connection
Heidegger high-jacked from Husserl the concept of intentionality. For Husserl,
intentionality is a defining feature of consciousness. It is that which gives
consciousness its aboutness; it is that in virtue of which consciousness is
always consciousness of.
To see what Heiddegger was up to in Division I of Sein und Zeit, we must
emphasize that he ditched the equation of wakefulness — even alert, busy-asa-bee wakefulness — and consciousness. As Heidegger saw it, most of our
waking actions are unattended by and unshaped by mental states. This
mindlessness of ordinary waking human behaviour Heidegger calls the
intentionality of coping. Consider a case in which you are watching a shortorder cook working at full blast at a New York midday. It is easy to see his
behaviour as connectionist and mindless, as behaviour reflecting repetoires of
different skills which he draws upon concurrently and distributively, and without
a jot of reflection when things are going well. Consciousness enters the
Heideggerian picture when coping meets with resistance, where resistance
can be seen as any event which prompts the coper to attend.
Here is a view that carries important consequences for the analysis of
propositional assent — indeed for conversation generally. On the received
view, when I assert, e.g., that the cat is on the mat, I in effect report a current
mental state (belief), an object of my present attention. My assertion is sincere
if the belief actually exists, and true if the belief is also true. Conversation more
generally still is a sequence of exchanges of transparent propositional contents
modulo the usual speech acts.

If Heidegger is right, the received view is wholly wrong. Conversation is just
linguistic coping, as Heidegger sees it. If so, then you and I are less often in a
state of belief than many theorists suppose; and when you are telling me about
the amenities of, say, Amsterdam, though you tell me the truth, you are not
transmitting your beliefs and you are not inducing new beliefs in me, unless
perhaps what you tell me is surprising. ("No kidding, the best intellectuals’ bar
is right in the middle of the red light district!"). When I stop and think — when I
put a temporary (and expensive) halt to coping — I find that in what I do in the
world I am infrequently the owner of mental states, infrequently the possessor of
beliefs. It is a respectable way of being mindless.
Heidegger’s conjectures about consciousness and coping turn out to have
been rather prescient, although no one would say that the now massive
research programme on consciousness and its limitations owes anything
directly to the German existentialist. Not everything is known about
consciousness, needless to say But what is known is of critical importance for
fuzzy theory. Consciousness has a surprisingly narrow bandwidth. It processes
information very slowly. The rate of processing from the five senses combined
— the sensorsium, as the Mediaevals used to say — is in the neighbourhood
of 11 million bits per second. For any of those seconds, something fewer than
40 bits makes its way into consciousness. Consciousness therefore is highly
entropic. At any given time there is an extraordinary quantity of information
processed by the human system — in it to speak — which consciousness
cannot gain access to. Consciousness is a thermodynamically costly state for
a human system to be in. Equally, the bandwidth of language is far, far smaller
than the bandwidth of sensation. A great deal of what we know — most in fact
— we aren’t able to tell one another. Our sociolinguistic intercourse is a series
of exchanges whose bandwidth is 16 bits per second. More surprising still are
Benjamin Libet’s experiments29 which indicate that when a human subject
consciously decides to perform an action A — say, phoning his colleague in
London — that action is underway a full half-second before consciousness
enters the picture. Intentional actions start up prior to the generation of
conscious intentions to perform them.
Libet was inclined to think that his discoveries harboured an important
metaphysical consequence. He thought that they constituted a counterexample
to materialism. Roger Penrose is similarly minded. He has argued that a
materialistic account of Libet’s data entails a substantial rejigging of basic
physics.30 Even so, not everyone has accepted Libet’s basic thesis (antimaterialist consequences aside).31 Dennett, for example, argues that Lipet’s
thesis is put in doubt by its reliance upon subjects’ introspections, concerning
which Dennett holds that there are no facts of the matter.32
Conscious experience is dominantly linear. Human beings are notoriously
inadept at being in multiples of conscious states at once. And time flows.
Taken together these facts loosely amount to an operational definition of the
linearity of consciousness. Linearity plays a role in the cognitive economy that
tight money plays in the other economy. It slows things down and it simplifies

them. Linearity is a suppressor of complexity; and reductions in complexity
coincide with reductions in information. The sheer paucity of information
possessed by human consciousness at any given time contrasts with
environments known to be fuzzy. Fuzziness, unlike probability, is unchanged by
arbitrarily large increases in information.
For a very long time in the Western intellectual tradition, logic has been a
linguistic enterprise. This includes the logic of practical reasoning. There exists
abundant evidence that a good deal of reasoning is subconscious. To the
extent that there is so, fuzzy logic may well be a model of the right type. To the
extent that reasoning is a conscious matter, it is not a fit candidate for fuzzy
analysis, not anyhow if we are looking for models that are psychologically real.
For consciousness cannot abide high levels of information. Fuzziness, on the
other hand, like the thin starlet who can wolf down 6000 calories a day, is an
informational glutton. Zadeh knows this, surprisingly. In the 1965 paper it is
elevated to a law — the Law of Incompatibility:
As the complexity of a system increases, our ability to make precise yet
significant statements about its behaviour diminishes until a threshold is
reached beyond which precision and significance (or relevance) become
almost mutually exclusive characteristics.33
There we have it. When practical reasoning is conscious, fuzzy logic is not the
appropriate model. It is not even the appropriate ideal model. But what, then,
of the impressive success of fuzzy engineering? Impressive a success as it
surely is, it is perhaps not an impressively impressive success.34 Zadeh’s
engineering work was designed to help with pattern recognition and like issues
in computing. It was also directed toward the provision of frameworks within
which humans supply computer-controlled systems with vaguely formulated
information. And let’s not forget fuzzy bullet trains and fuzzy washing-machines.
It is rather striking that all these engineering applications are generated within
a logico-mathematical framework that is entirely classical. Bearing in mind that
a fuzzy set is nothing more than a classical function from a universe to the unit
internal, the success of the engineering does nothing to show the classical
scaffolding to be defective.
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